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Abstract
When demand for a good exceeds its supply, queuing mechanisms are commonly used to
allocate the good in question to citizens. However, very long queues result in excessive wait times
and this can lead to violence. As such, the purpose of this paper is to analyze two stochastic models
of goods allocation with queuing and the possibility of violence. In the first model, there is no
capacity constraint. Using this model, we compute the long run delay per citizen in allocating the
pertinent good. Next, we discuss the computation of the equilibrium probabilities for our discrete-
time Markov chain theoretic model. In the second model, we capture the violence aspect of the
underlying story explicitly with a capacity constraint. Then, we compute the long run fraction of
citizens who are not provided the relevant good and the long run fraction of time the good allocating
public official is busy.
Keywords: Capacity Constraint, Goods Allocation, Queuing Mechanism, Scarcity, Violence
JEL Codes: O12, H40, D81
31. Introduction
Public officials in many countries and particularly those in developing countries and in
transition economies often use queuing mechanisms to allocate scarce goods to citizens. Examples
of goods that have been allocated using queuing include rice in Sri Lanka (Gunawardana 2000),
banking services in Nigeria (Woldie 2003), formal sector jobs in Nicaragua (Pisani and Pagan 2003),
and jobs in general in urban Ethiopia (Serneels 2007). A key feature of these goods allocation
mechanisms is that they involve waiting in line by citizens. Put differently, citizens have to actually
wait in queue to obtain the good that is being allocated by the relevant public official. 
The reader will understand that these queuing mechanisms take on particular salience during
times of severe scarcity brought on by natural factors and/or by governmental policies. Batabyal
(2005a) tells us that in such hard times, the available supplies of the germane scarce goods are
allocated by public officials in many developing countries in particular using queuing mechanisms
of one sort or another. From the standpoint of this paper, what is significant is that in times of acute
scarcity, demand for a good greatly exceeds its supply. Therefore, if a good characterized by excess
demand is to be allocated to citizens by means of a queuing mechanism then, in the time period of
interest, it is important for a public provider to regulate the length of the queue. Concrete examples
from two different countries explain why.
In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez’s desire to bring the powerful state owned oil
company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) under his control has caused considerable political
upheaval. As reported by the Economist (Anonymous, 2003, 2009), there was a severe shortage of
both cooking gas and petrol in the country. As a result, in some provider facilities, there were queues
of citizens that could be measured not in hours but in days. This situation gave rise not only to a
4Go to http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/07/25/2315138.htm for additional details on this incident.
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secondary market for places in the fuel queues but it also resulted in considerable economic unrest
and violence.
In Egypt, the policies of President Hosni Mubarak’s government have made life for many
of this nation’s 75 million citizens rather difficult. In particular, the prices of many food items have
been rising and it is now common for public officials to allocate scarce goods such as bread by
means of queuing mechanisms. The Economist (Anonymous, 2008) describes instances where, inter
alia, rising food prices have led to spontaneous protests and to urban riots that have led, as in
Venezuela, to violence.
Very recently, violence broke out among the 50,000 people who queued to grab the last batch
of Olympic tickets that went on sale in Beijing, China.4 This example and the examples in the
preceding two paragraphs help explain why it is necessary for a public provider—who uses a
queuing mechanism to allocate a particular good—to regulate the length of the pertinent queue. Such
an action effectively caps the length of the queue. In turn, this prevents the phenomenon of overly
long citizen wait times and thereby reduces the likelihood of violence.
Despite the demonstrated importance of having a capacity constraint for queue based goods
allocation mechanisms, to the best of our knowledge, this question has received virtually no
theoretical attention in the literature. Lui (1985), Batabyal and Nijkamp (2004), and Batabyal and
Yoo (2007) have used queuing models to study bribery and corruption. Athreya and Majumdar
(2005) have analyzed a queuing model in which a reorganization of two government departments
may increase efficiency. Although all four of these papers refer either to the optimal queue capacity
determination issue or to the expected queue size in a stochastic equilibrium, they do not explicitly
5analyze the question of allocating a good with a queuing mechanism when violence is a potential
problem. Recently, Batabyal (2005a) has shed light on the question of violence prevention in the
context of goods allocation with queuing mechanisms. Specifically, Batabyal (2005a) uses the so
called  queuing model—see Ross (2003, pp. 480-490) or Tijms (2003, pp. 188-190) for
textbook expositions—to determine the smallest capacity that will keep the likelihood of violence
below an exogenously specified value. 
In this paper, we use a new discrete-time Markov chain theoretic framework and extend the
analysis in Batabyal (2005a) in particular by analyzing hitherto unstudied questions concerning the
allocation of goods using queuing mechanisms. Specifically, we analyze two stochastic models of
goods allocation with queuing and the possibility of violence. In the first model, there is no capacity
constraint. Using this model, we first compute the long run delay per citizen in allocating the
pertinent good and then we discuss the computation of our Markov chain model’s equilibrium
probabilities. In the second model, we capture the violence aspect of the underlying story with a
capacity constraint. Then, we ascertain the long run fraction of citizens who are not provided the
relevant good and the long run fraction of time the good allocating public official is busy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 delineates our discrete-time
Markov chain theoretic model of a good allocation process with no capacity constraint. Section 2.2
computes the long run delay per citizen in allocating the germane good. Section 2.3 discusses how
the equilibrium probabilities for our discrete-time Markov chain theoretic model might actually be
computed by demonstrating that the equilibrium distribution of this model has a geometric tail. Next,
section 3.1 describes a discrete-time Markov chain theoretic model of a good allocation process with
a capacity constraint. Section 3.2 determines the long run fraction of citizens who are not provided
5Economists such as Lui (1985) and Batabyal (2005a, 2005b) who have studied the allocation of goods with queuing mechanisms have
frequently assumed that these goods allocation—or more generally service—times are exponentially distributed. We are using the
Erlang distribution in this paper because this distribution is a more general distribution than the exponential distribution. Specifically,
an Erlang  distributed random variable can be decomposed as the sum of  independent random variables each of which is
exponentially distributed with the same mean  See Tijms (2003, pp. 442-443) for additional details on the Erlang distribution.
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the good in question. Section 3.3 computes the long run fraction of time the good allocating public
official is busy. Finally, section 4 concludes and then discusses one way in which the research in this
paper might be extended.
2. A Good Allocation Model With No Capacity Constraint
2.1. Preliminaries
Consider a particular region in a developing country or in a transition economy in a time of
acute economic scarcity. Within this region, we focus on a single public official who is in charge
of allocating an essential but scarce good such as bread or rice to citizens. It takes this official a
probabilistic amount of time to allocate the good in question to citizens. We suppose that these
probabilistic good allocation times are independent random variables with a common Erlang 
distribution.5 For reasons of mathematical tractability, we suppose that 
In each time period, a citizen arrives at our public official’s distribution facility to obtain a
single unit of the good under study. By “single unit of the good” we mean something like a single
loaf of bread, a single bag of rice, or a single cannister of water. Our public official interacts with
a single citizen at a point in time. This official’s distribution facility has enough space so that
arriving citizens who find the official busy wait in a queue until it is their turn to be allocated the
good by this official. 
The reader will note that in the model of this section, we do not have a capacity constraint
on the number of queuing citizens that our public official’s distribution facility can hold. Therefore,
6To keep the subsequent mathematical analysis straightforward, we suppose that this Markov chain satisfies assumption 3.3.1 in Tijms
(2003, p. 98). In other words, we are assuming that our discrete-time Markov chain has a regeneration state that is ultimately reached
from every initial state with probability one and that the expected number of steps needed to return from this regeneration state to
itself is finite.
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it is certainly possible that violence will break out among the queuing citizens if the long run
average delay per citizen in allocating the pertinent good gets too long. Given this state of affairs,
let us now derive an expression for this long run average delay per citizen.
2.2. Long run average delay
In order to use a discrete-time Markov chain theoretic framework, let us recall the contents
of footnote 2 and use the fact that the Erlang  distributed good allocation time can be thought
of as the sum of  independent subtasks each of which has an exponential distribution with mean 
Now, from the standpoint of our good allocating public official, let  denote the number of
uncompleted subtasks present just before the arrival epoch of the  citizen. Then, the stochastic
process  is a discrete-time Markov chain with state space 6 
The one-step transition probabilities for this Markov chain are given by
(1)
where  The reader should note that in writing equation (1) and the expression for 
we have used the fact that when our public official is not idle, his service completions of subtasks,
8as it were, occur in accordance with a Poisson process—see Ross (2003, pp. 288-329) or Tijms
(2003, pp. 1-31) for textbook accounts—with parameter  
Let  denote the equilibrium distribution for our discrete-time Markov chain. This means
that
(2)
With this definition in place, some thought tells us that the long run average delay per citizen in
allocating the germane good is given by
(3)
From a practical perspective, equation (3) is of great interest because the likelihood of violence in
our public official’s distribution facility depends fundamentally on the ratio on the right-hand-side
(RHS) of this equation. In particular, if the probability of violence is to be kept low then this RHS
ratio must be made small. Note that this ratio can be made small by making  a parameter of the
Erlang distributed good allocation times, as large as possible. 
A second way in which the likelihood of violence can be kept low is for our public official
to put in place an explicit capacity constraint for his distribution facility. Practically, what this means
is that when the number of queuing citizens reaches a certain finite number, no further citizens are
allowed into this facility during the relevant time period. We shall study the impact of an explicit
capacity constraint in section 3 below but before we do that, we would like to briefly discuss
whether, in a given practical setting, the equilibrium probabilities for our Markov chain model, i.e.,
the  can actually be computed.
92.3. The geometric tail
The computation of the equilibrium probabilities for our Markov chain model is made
difficult by the fact that the state space  for this Markov chain  is infinite. In such
cases, it is standard to use the so called “geometric tail approach”—see Tijms (2003, pp. 111-
114)—to compute the equilibrium probabilities of the relevant Markov chain. However, before this
approach can be used, one must first show that the Markov chain under consideration has a
geometric tail. We now show that the Markov chain  that we have been studying thus far in this
section does indeed have a geometric tail. 
We shall use the discussion in Tijms (2003, pp. 111-113) to make our argument. Now, to
show that our Markov chain  has a geometric tail, we have to show that condition B in Tijms
(2003, p. 113) is satisfied. To this end, let our Erlang distribution’s parameter  equal  in condition
B. In addition, let  equal  in condition B. Then, using condition B we see that as 
where  is a constant and  is the unique root of the equation —also see equation
3.4.9 in Tijms (2003, p. 113)—on the unit interval  
We have now shown that condition B in Tijms (2003, p. 113) is satisfied and hence the
Markov chain of interest  does have a geometric tail. This means that the infinite system of
linear equations for the  can be reduced to a finite system of linear equations using the geometric
tail method described in Tijms (2003, pp. 113-116). From a practical perspective, this means that
the equilibrium probabilities for our Markov chain  can actually be computed. We now proceed
to analyze a discrete-time Markov chain theoretic model of a good allocation process with a capacity
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constraint. 
3. A Good Allocation Model With a Capacity Constraint
3.1. Preliminaries 
The stochastic environment in which our public official now allocates the good in question
to arriving citizens is the same as in section 2.1. The only difference is that in order to reduce the
likelihood of violence arising from an inordinately lengthy long run delay per citizen in allocating
the germane good (see equation (3)), our public official puts in place an explicit constraint on how
many citizens may queue in his distribution facility. 
In particular, we suppose that once  citizens are in the distribution facility, no more citizens
are allowed into this facility. Citizens who arrive at this facility when it is full, i.e., when  citizens
are already present, are turned away and they leave without obtaining the scarce good under study.
In this setting, our first task now is to determine the long run fraction of citizens who are turned
away from the distribution facility and hence not provided with the good in question. 
3.2. Long run fraction of citizens 
Our discrete-time Markov chain  is the same as in section 2 except that the state space
is now different. Specifically, the state space is  where  is the finite capacity
put in place by our public official to reduce the likelihood of violence in the distribution facility. We
now have to specify the one-step transition probabilities for our Markov chain  with the
constricted state space. To this end, note that for any state  with  we have 
(4)
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and, for any state  with  we have 
(5)
Following the methodology employed in section 2.2, let us denote the equilibrium
distribution for the Markov chain of this section by  Now, using the definition
of the equilibrium distribution and some thought we can deduce that the long run fraction of citizens
who are turned away from the distribution facility and hence not provided the good in question is
given by
(6)
Equation (6) tells us that when our public official’s focus is on reducing the likelihood of
violence in his distribution facility, the long run fraction of citizens who will come away from this
distribution facility without the pertinent good is equal to the sum of the constricted state space
Markov chain’s equilibrium probabilities. Inspecting equation (6) it is straightforward to confirm
that the larger the individual state equilibrium probabilities for the states involved in the summation
on the RHS of equation (6), the larger is the long run fraction of citizens who do not obtain the good
in question. We now proceed to our final task in this paper and that is to ascertain the long run
fraction of time our good allocating public official is busy. 
3.3. Long run fraction of time
To compute this fraction, first note that the arrival rate of citizens who are admitted into our
7Little’s formula is a well known result that applies to virtually all queuing systems. See Ross (2003, pp. 476-478) and Tijms (2003,
pp. 50-53) for textbook expositions of Little’s formula.
12
public official’s distribution facility and not turned away is given by  Now using Little’s
formula7 with the preceding result, we reason that the long run fraction of time our public official
is busy is given by
(7)
Equation (7) tells us that the long run fraction of time our public official is busy allocating
the good in question to citizens is given by the product of the Erlang distribution’s two parameters 
and the sum of the equilibrium probabilities of being in a specific number of states. Inspecting
equation (7), it is straightforward to confirm two results. First, as in the case of equation (3) in
section 2.2, the long run fraction of time our public official is busy can be reduced by increasing the
value of a particular parameter of the Erlang distribution, namely,  Second, as either the Erlang
distribution parameter  or the finite capacity  increases, the long run fraction of time our public
official is busy also increases. 
In section 2 with no capacity constraint, we derived a single metric for the likelihood of
violence, namely, equation (3). However, in this section, we have two metrics for the likelihood of
violence and these two metrics capture two different aspects of this likelihood. To see this, observe
that violence can occur either inside or outside our public official’s distribution facility. Equation
(6) pertains to citizens who have been turned away from the distribution facility and hence this
equation is a measure of the likelihood of violence outside the distribution facility. In contrast,
equation (7) concerns citizens who are inside the distribution facility and hence this equation is a
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measure of the likelihood of violence inside our public official’s distribution facility. The upshot of
this discussion is that our public official is aware that violence can occur both outside and inside the
distribution facility and he is not only paying attention to the likelihood of violence inside the
distribution facility. 
If we think of the capacity constraint  as a control variable for our public official then
inspection of equations (6) and (7) tells us that both these long run fractions are increasing functions
of  Therefore, one possible course of action for our public official would be to choose  and
optimize a weighted sum of the two metrics in equations (6) and (7) where the weights sum to unity
and magnitude of the weights reflects the emphasis placed by this public official on the likelihood
of violence either outside or inside the distribution facility. The optimal value of  would be the
solution to this weighted optimization problem and this value may or may not be “small.” Having
said this, note that if the concern is that the optimal value of  might be “extremely small” then one
could solve this weighted optimization problem with an explicit constraint requiring  to be bigger
than some desired positive integer and this positive integer would then become the effective lower
bound for  This completes our discussion of the good allocation model with a capacity constraint.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed two discrete-time Markov chain theoretic models of goods
allocation by a public official with queuing and with the possibility of violence. In the first model,
there was no capacity constraint. Using this model, we first computed the long run delay per citizen
in allocating the pertinent good. Next, we discussed a way in which the equilibrium probabilities for
our Markov chain model might actually be computed. In the second model, we captured the violence
aspect of the underlying story with a capacity constraint. Then, we first determined the long run
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fraction of citizens who are not provided the relevant good and next we ascertained the long run
fraction of time the good allocating public official is busy.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. In what
follows, we suggest one potential extension. Consistent with the discussion in the last paragraph of
section 3, it would be useful to set up and solve an optimization problem for our public official in
which this official selects the finite capacity  to, for instance, optimize the net social benefit to the
region under study from the allocation of the pertinent scarce good. Studies that analyze this aspect
of the problem will enhance our understanding of the nexuses between the allocation of goods by
means of queuing mechanisms and the question of preventing one or more kinds of violence.
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